sense of legal obligation, 1 an account that this paper will refer to as the "standard view." Under this standard view, CIL is conceived of as having two components: an objective, state practice component, and a subjective, sense of legal obligation component.
The second component is sometimes referred to by the Latin phrase opinio juris sive necessitatis, which translates as "a belief that something is required by law or necessity,"
although commentators and courts often shorten the phrase simply to "opinio juris." This account of CIL has been endorsed by international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, 2 and it is often recited by representatives of states.
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Despite its general acceptance, the standard view of CIL suffers from a variety of difficulties. Some of these difficulties are evidentiary. While it is accepted that one must show state practice and opinio juris to establish a rule of CIL, there is no consensus about what evidence establishes either of these two elements. It is not clear, for example, how much state practice is required, or how longstanding it needs to be. Nor is it clear how the beliefs of nation-states about the content of CIL are to be determined when, as is often the case, the states fail to articulate a position. In addition, although adjudicators frequently point to treaties as evidence of CIL, the extent to which treaties constitute valid evidence of CIL is mysterious and controversial. There are also serious and growing questions about the usefulness of CIL. CIL seems structurally unable to address many of the world's most pressing issues, such as (to name a few examples) climate change, international financial stability, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. For problems like these, a requirement that a substantial number of nations already act in accordance with the desired norm, out of a sense that such behavior is legally required, seems to require the impossible. 10 Relatedly, the proliferation of multilateral treaties has raised new questions about the need for CIL as a distinct source of international law. Most of the major issue areas that were historically regulated by CIL are now regulated, to one degree or another, by treaties. Treaties have a variety of advantages over CIL, in that they provide more direct evidence of what states want (since they are the product of express negotiation), they can provide for greater specificity (since they are typically in writing), and they can establish institutional mechanisms to promote monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement of the norms. In addition to multilateral treaties, nations are also increasingly resorting to the creation of "soft law"-that is, non-binding international agreements. As with treaties, but unlike with CIL, soft law agreements are typically committed to writing and involve express negotiation. The possible result of these seems to provide a convenient license for judicial law-making, a process similar in many respects to the creation of judge-made rules of the English common law."). 9 See Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 173 (2010) . 10 These issues may also require a level of specificity and administrative structure that CIL cannot provide. For an observation along these lines a half-century ago, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122 (1964) ("[C] ustom is an unsuitable vehicle for international 'welfare' or 'co-operative' law. The latter demands positive regulation of economic, social, cultural, and administrative matters, a regulation that can only be effective by specific formulation and enactment.").
developments, as Joel Trachtman has observed, may be the "increasing marginalization of custom." 11 Finally, there are conceptual difficulties with the standard conception of CIL. Many of these difficulties relate to the concept of opinio juris. As Professor Hugh Thirlway memorably noted:
The precise definition of the opinio juris, the psychological element in the formation of custom, the philosophers' stone which transmutes the inert mass of accumulated usage into the gold of binding legal rules, has probably caused more academic controversy than all the actual contested claims made by States on the basis of alleged custom, put together. 12 Some scholars question whether it is even possible to find opinio juris in the pure sense that seems to be contemplated by the standard view.
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A related conceptual problem is that, even though one of the purported virtues of CIL is that it can evolve in response to changing circumstances, the standard view does not seem well structured to allow for such evolution. The principal account of how it occurs is that individual nations are supposed to violate rules of CIL and then hope that other nations will acquiesce in the violation.
14 Since the violating state by definition would not be acting 
INT'L L. 1, 9 (1984-87) (noting that the "paradox of the traditional theory of customary international law has never been persuasively resolved"); Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 662, 667 (1953) ("There is here, certainly, a challenging theoretical problem which, as far as this writer can see, has not yet found a satisfactory solution."). 32 See, e.g., VAN HOOF, supra note 17, at 99. Geny suggested something along these lines. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 131 (1999) . 33 See, e.g., BYERS, CUSTOM, supra note 32, at 131 ("This [mistake] approach is unsatisfactory because it is inconceivable that an entire legal process . . . could be based on a persistent misconception. changes in the law would be driven by the least sophisticated actors, which hardly seems like a recipe for effective and desirable law making.
Another theory that has been suggested could be called the "fiat theory." The idea is that one or a small number of states purposely assert the existence of a customary rule, even though they do not believe that it is required by preexisting custom, and other states accept the claim and act accordingly. To the extent that other states accept the claim out of a mistaken belief that it correctly reflects preexisting custom, this theory tends to merge into the mistake theory, and it has similar problems. Another possibility is that states accept the claim because they are coerced into doing so by virtue of the power of the states asserting the claim (Imagine Britain in the nineteenth century, for example imposing CIL rules of admiralty law when it had the most powerful navy.) While such a scenario is easy to imagine, it does not genuinely involve practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
Moreover, a legal system in which a small number of states in effect impose law on the rest of the international community, although perhaps an accurate description of how CIL worked in the past, may be even more normatively problematic than the mistake theory.
In addition to the mistake and fiat theories, there are a variety of other theories about how a custom that is not initially perceived as legally binding might come to be understood that way, after passing through certain stages of development. 34 The actual mechanism of this transformation, however, is not specified, so the chronological paradox is left unresolved. 35 Other efforts to resolve the paradox involve alterations to the standard view of 34 See, e.g., VAN 1978) . 35 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 30, at 421 (noting that the gradual ripening theory "brings in nothing to solve the problem" because " [w] e are still unable to reveal how the transformation from a political opinio necessitatis into a legally motivated opinio juris was possible"); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2014) ("The riddle remains, however, as to how this transition occurs: if for it to occur requires the presence of a justified belief that it has already occurred, it can in fact never occur.").
CIL. For example, Hans Kelsen argued-contrary to the standard view-that it need not be established that states perceive that a practice is legally obligatory, as long as they perceive that it as normatively required.
36

Reference to Custom in the ICJ Statute
Before considering an alternative account of CIL, it is important to understand that the standard conception of CIL was not always the prevailing view, and, in fact, does not precisely accord with the reference to custom in the ICJ's governing statute. Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute lists the sources of law to be applied by the ICJ, and it includes in the list "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Instead of saying that CIL is based on practices and opinio juris, this article says that international custom is evidence of practices and opinio juris. Moreover, the phrasing seems to entail only one component-"international custom"-rather than two components as under the standard view. Some commentators ignore these differences and simply assert that the phrasing articulates the standard view. 37 Other commentators acknowledge the differences but attribute them to poor drafting.
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In fact, Article 38(1) does not articulate the standard view, and it is not the product of poor drafting. Rather, it articulates a different conception of CIL than the one that is now 36 See KELSEN, supra note 46, at 307 ("They must believe that they apply a norm, but they need not believe that it is a legal norm which they apply."). 37 See or English common law. . . . It sits as an oddity in the law of nations, and, perhaps is the only thing that distinguishes the exceptional character of CIL. 41 For example, some commentators have suggested that the opinio juris concept finds support in Blackstone's treatise on the laws of England, 42 but in fact Blackstone merely argued that customs needed to have a mandatory rather than discretionary character in order to qualify as law, not that they had to be shown to be followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Belgium. The committee specifically rejected a proposal by Descamps that would have referred to "international custom, being practice between nations accepted by them as law." 44 In other words, the committee rejected a description of CIL that would, like the standard view today, have set forth a separate opinio juris requirement. 45 The phrasing of the PCIJ Statute's reference to custom was apparently influenced by the "historical school" of jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, which is generally traced that customary law emanated from a collective spirit or will of the people-a "Volksgeist."
47 Importantly, Francois Geny-whose writings are said to be the intellectual genesis of opinio juris for CIL-expressly disagreed with the Volksgeist concept.
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The Volksgeist concept has a natural law character that is probably not viable in today's more positivistic legal culture. 49 It also became associated to some extent with Nazi ideology. 50 Not surprisingly, therefore, it has generally been rejected in the post-World War II custom literature.
51
The Volksgeist approach did, however, have one significant advantage over what is now the standard view: it had an answer to the famous chronological paradox that has plagued the standard view of CIL.
The approach of the historical school to CIL avoided the chronological paradox by hypothesizing that custom was evidence of something deeper and preexisting. Under that approach, the development of a customary obligation did not depend on nations following a practice out of a sense of legal obligation. Rather, the obligation would exist, and the custom would then arise to reflect it. Savigny specifically recognized the need to avoid the 46 See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 308-09 (1952). 47 See ILA Report, supra note 48, at 32; see also Walden, supra note 27, at 358 ("As originally formulated by the adherents of the historical school, the theory of opinio juris was intimately connected with their doctrine which saw law as an expression of the Volksgeist."). French legal theorists developed a somewhat analogous idea that custom was evidence of an underlying social solidarity (solidarite sociale [A]ccording to [this idea], the first act must have been induced by the necessitates opinio; consequently if it rests upon an error it must not be of any account at all as to the origination of customary law. The same is true of the second act which now becomes the first and of the third and every following one. The formation of a customary law is hence, unless one of those conditions is given up, wholly impossible.
52
The approach of the historical school avoided this problem, Savigny explained, because "the rule of law was merely manifested by the custom, not generated by it; consequently in the first demonstrable act the necessitatis opinio, free of all error, might and must have been present."
53
There is another important respect in which some of the earlier theories of CIL differed from today's standard view. Instead of requiring that states believe that a practice was already legally required, some of the earlier theories hypothesized that it was sufficient if states believed that a legal rule in support of the practice was necessary. Alphonse Rivier, for example, wrote that "the custom or the usage of the nations is the manifestation of the international juridical consciousness operated by the facts that are continuously repeated with the sense of their necessity." 54 Such an approach appears to be consistent with the broader phrase opinio juris sive necessitatis, the latter portion of which is often omitted in modern discussions of CIL.
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In sum, the standard, two-part conception of CIL has not always been the dominant view, and it is not fully reflected in the ICJ's governing statute. 56 A key reason why some of the earlier approaches died away was the shift towards positivism. Instead of hypothesizing that custom is a reflection of some underlying spirit, will, or consciousness, the standard view today attempts to ground CIL in the actual practices and beliefs of states. In doing so, however, the standard view has difficulty resolving a host of evidentiary, normative, and conceptual problems associated with deriving law in this fashion.
State Preferences Account
A fundamental problem with much of the theorizing about CIL, this paper contends, is that it fails to identify which decisionmaker it has in mind. Instead, the discussion proceeds as if CIL existed in the abstract without any particular human entity to interpret and apply it. As will be seen, once a decisionmaker is hypothesized, it becomes easier to gain traction on some of the difficulties surrounding CIL.
The remainder of this paper sketches an alternate account of CIL that addresses the chronological paradox as well as other well-known problems with the standard view of CIL. 55 See THIRLWAY, supra note 35, at 78 ("[T]he phrase in its entirety signifies that it is or may be sufficient if there is an opinio to the effect that the action (or refraining from it, as the case may be) is required as being, in some sense, necessary."). 56 For another indication that the standard, two-part conception of CIL that is prevalent today was not always the prevailing view, consider the fact that in attempting in 1950 to summarize the requirements for CIL, Manley Hudson (after having served as a judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice) identified four rather than two components: " Under this "state preferences" approach, the application of CIL by an international adjudicator should be understood as an effort to determine the preferences of the relevant community of states concerning the norms that should apply in the absence of a controlling treaty. The paradigm adjudicatory institution considered here is the ICJ, although the analysis potentially applies to other institutions as well and might also apply (probably with modifications) to domestic courts applying CIL.
Under this account, adjudicators look to state practice as well as to the articulated views of states in ascertaining state preferences, but they are able to recognize rules of CIL through reasoning that does not conform to the standard view. To be clear, the claim is not that this is always what happens, or that adjudicators perform this task consistently or perfectly. Nor is it a claim that adjudicative institutions all have the same amount of discretion; they clearly do not. Rather, the claim is that the state preferences account describes much of what one sees in international adjudication with respect to CIL and that it is a useful way of understanding what is meant by CIL in that context.
The chronological paradox and first violators.
The state preferences account does not require proof that states are already following a practice out of a sense of legal obligation before a CIL rule can be recognized. Rather, a CIL rule can be recognized when it is evident-from state practices, statements, and other evidence-that the rule is something that the relevant community of states wishes to have as a binding norm going forward. 57 To be sure, the past practices of states are still highly relevant under this account, 57 For a somewhat similar perspective, see LEPARD, supra note 44, at 98-99 (arguing that "opinio juris be interpreted as a requirement that states generally believe that it is desirable now or in the near future to have an authoritative legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain state conduct") (emphasis in original). For similar reasons, the state preferences account is able to explain how CIL can be applied against the first violator of a norm. If a practice is uniform and has no deviations, there may be no opportunity for a sense of legal obligation to develop. When the first deviation occurs, however, the issue of whether the practice is legally binding suddenly becomes relevant. Under the standard view of CIL, the past practice might not count, since it was not necessarily being followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Under a state preferences approach, by contrast, the past practice would be relevant in assessing whether states prefer to have a binding rule governing the issue, and an adjudicator would be open to finding that the first deviation violates CIL.
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This account also confirms the argument, made most famously by Bin Cheng, that it is possible for there to be "instant custom." 59 Traditionally, it was thought that the creation of CIL tended to be a longstanding process of action and reaction among states. The modern view, however, is that CIL can be created quickly, and the ICJ has confirmed this possibility. 60 Commentators note that technological changes in communication, along with international fora such as the United Nations, allow for much more extensive and rapid corresponding norm as law."); Walden, The Subjective Element, supra note 47, at 97 (" [W] hat is involved may be, not a belief that the practice is already legally binding, but a claim that it ought to be legally binding."). 58 Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("[W]hen, as is the case here, there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought before them. In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and usages of civilized nations."). 59 See directly on point, let alone state practice followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Under a state preferences approach, by contrast, a decisionmaker would be free to apply the principle to the new set of facts. (The possibility that a similar result could be accomplished by utilizing the "general principles" category of the ICJ's jurisdiction rather than the custom category is considered at the end of this paper.)
A good example of the distinction between general principles and specific rules is the famous Schooner Exchange decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that is said to be the fount of the international law of sovereign immunity. 63 In that decision, the Court had to decide whether to accord sovereign immunity in an admiralty case to a French warship.
There was little state practice directly on point, so the Court explained that it would be "necessary to rely much on general principles and on a train of reasoning founded on cases in some degree analogous to this. Rather, the court noted that it was aware of no relevant decisions of international tribunals and that the decisions of national courts that had been cited to it "sometimes support one view and sometimes the other." 68 Because it appeared that national jurisprudence was divided, the court said it need not consider such jurisprudence further because "it is hardly possible to see in it an indication of the existence of the restrictive rule of international law." 69 Most of the dissenting opinions also failed to focus on evidence of state practice or opinio juris; rather, they referred to propositions such as "the spirit of international law," 70 the "consensus omnium" of the international community, 71 and the "principle" of territoriality. 72 The two partial exceptions are the dissent of Judge Moore, which reviewed a number of domestic cases, and the dissent of Judge Altamira, who reviewed the legislation of a number of states. Of particular relevance to this paper, Altamira concluded his dissent by acknowledging that when international tribunals adjudicate issues of CIL "there are moments in time in which the rule, implicitly discernible, has not as yet taken shape in the eyes of the world, but is so forcibly suggested by precedents that it would be rendering good service to the cause of justice and law to assist its appearance in a form in which it will have all the force rightly belonging to rules of positive law appertaining to that category." The key point is that the standard view does not help resolve such a case.
Evidentiary issues. The state preferences account also helps address a variety of evidentiary uncertainties that surround the standard account of CIL. First, this account avoids artificially excluding state practices from consideration merely because they might be followed for reasons other than a sense of legal obligation. For example, nations presumably follow many customs out of self-interest (and, indeed, one would assume that customs develop because they are generally in the interest of the participants), yet it is unclear why behavior motivated by self-interest should not count when discerning CIL. Similarly, nations may follow a custom out of a sense of morality (abolishing the slave trade in the nineteenth century, for example), but, again, it is unclear why that should count against the custom qualifying as CIL, since the law and morality presumably overlap. Finally, many customs described today as CIL are probably followed out of bureaucratic habit rather than a conscious sense of legal obligation, and yet such a state of mind (even though not opinio juris) probably is desirable for international law compliance. 75 There has also been much debate in the literature about whether verbal acts by states can be considered a form of state practice. Those who object to such classification worry that these acts will end up being "double counted" as both practice and evidence of opinio juris. Under the state preferences account, verbal acts would certainly be considered, and the classification debate is unimportant, as is the worry about double counting. 76 To be sure, verbal actions should be considered with caution, since they might simply be "cheap talk" as opposed to the expression of a genuine preference. But this concern relates to the weight to be given to the evidence, not its relevance.
A state preferences account further helps explain why treaties that do not purport to codify CIL are nevertheless relevant to the identification of rules of CIL, a question that has generated significant debate and uncertainty. Although parties to a treaty presumably have a 77 Cf. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), ¶ 90 (Judgment) (ICJ May 24, 2007) ("The fact invoked by Guinea that various international agreements, such as agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have established special legal régimes governing investment protection, or that provisions in this regard are commonly included in contracts entered into directly between States and foreign investors, is not sufficient to common evidence cited by courts in support of opinio juris. Indeed, in many cases, including many cases decided by the ICJ, they are essentially the only evidence cited. 78 The explanation, according to the account provided in this paper, is that adjudicators use treaties as evidence of state preferences. In many cases, of course, a treaty will reveal only a preference for binding consenting parties, but in some cases a widely-ratified treaty might reveal a preference for a universal, community-wide rule. For this and other evidentiary issues, a state preferences approach unifies the "traditional" inductive CIL with the "modern" deductive CIL. 79 Relatedly, it explains why adjudicators seem to use a sliding scale, requiring more evidence of practice when there is less evidence of opinio juris, and vice-versa. 80 The reason is that both types of evidence are information about state preferences.
International adjudicators also often place great weight on the agreement of the Argentina claimed that a treaty provision relating to this issue reflected CIL, and that Ghana did not dispute the existence of the immunity.
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The preferences referred to there are of course those of the parties to the case, not necessarily of the international community, and it is important to distinguish the two. This is why this paper refers to the preferences of the "relevant community" of states. That community depends in part on the nature of the adjudicative institution, and it will vary as between bilateral arbitration, regional adjudication, and a general adjudicatory body like the ICJ. But giving weight to these considerations makes perfect sense under a state preferences approach. After all, the community of states presumably has a preference for rules that are functionally beneficial and that promote cooperation. Changes to CIL. Finally, a state preferences approach does a better job than the standard view of explaining how CIL changes. As previously discussed, the only mechanism for change specified under the standard account is through violations of the norm, and these violations need to be either widespread or widely accepted in order to effectuate change. This process for change seems both difficult to achieve in practice and normatively questionable. Under a state preferences approach, by contrast, an adjudicator can recognize that the deviation, along with other evidence (such as evidence of changed circumstances), shows that the international community no longer prefers the prior rule. contrast, allows for a greater ability to recognize and permit evolutionary changes to CIL.
Potential Drawbacks
Despite the above advantages, there are potential drawbacks associated with the state preferences account. Perhaps most significantly, it envisions a quasi-legislative role for adjudicators, a role that naturally raises questions about the extent to which adjudicators have been properly charged to act in this fashion. Critics are likely to contend that adjudicators should be limited to apply the law as it already exists (lex lata) rather than the law as it should be (lex ferenda).
Questions of judicial authority to develop the law are common in a domestic legal system, particularly in a common law system, but they are more pronounced in the international system that (for the most part) lacks an agreed-upon central judiciary. A significant check on such authority, however, is the ability of states to withdraw (prospectively) from many international adjudicatory institutions. 88 Moreover, under the persistent objector doctrine, when a rule of CIL is first recognized, it should not be applied 87 See GAMAL MOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 115-28 (1984) . 88 In 1986, the United States withdrew from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction in response to the ICJ's decision to exercise jurisdiction in a case brought by Nicaragua concerning U.S. covert and military activities in that country. In 2005, after a series of ICJ rulings against the United States concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the United States withdrew from an optional protocol that allowed the ICJ to exercise jurisdiction in such cases.
to states that have clearly disagreed with the rule. Although not part of existing doctrine, it might also make sense to allow for subsequent withdrawal rights for certain types of CIL rules. 89 In any event, states can override CIL rules as between themselves by treaty, as long as the rules do not have the status of jus cogens norms. More generally, literature on international courts suggests that, even when they act creatively, these courts are constrained in a variety of ways. 90 The concern about judicial lawmaking can also be reduced by limiting the precedential effect of international adjudicatory decisions. For example, it may make sense to give greater emphasis to the fact that ICJ decisions are technically binding only on the parties and thus should not automatically be treated as the last word by the international community on the content of CIL. 91 The modern "fragmentation" of international law and institutions may make this easier by allowing for greater variation in judicial claims about the content of CIL.
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Another reason to allow for such variation in claims about CIL, and to limit the precedential effect of determinations of CIL, is that there is inherent tension between centralized adjudication and the maintenance of a system of customary law. 93 As noted above, one of the purported virtues of custom is that it can continue to evolve in response to changing conditions. Judicial decisions concerning its content, however, have the potential Another objection that might be raised against the state preferences account is that it is too positivistic-that is, its conception of how adjudicators should apply CIL is too dependent on what states want rather than, say, the demands of international justice. As an initial matter, it is worth keeping in mind that, like the standard view, the account here does not depend on the consent of individual states. Instead, the reference point, at least for general adjudicatory institutions like the ICJ, is the international community overall. (The reference point may be narrower for regional institutions and ad hoc arbitration.) In addition, this account is actually less positivistic than the standard view, since it is not as dependent on states already acting out of a sense of legal obligation. Indeed, one reason that there has been a proliferation of proposed "modern" approaches to CIL is that the standard view does not seem well suited to the protection of human rights, given the frequent divergence between international aspirations and international practice. Some commentators have acknowledged that when international adjudicators purport to identify rules of CIL they often do not seem to be applying the standard, two-component view, but these commentators contend that this phenomenon should be labeled as the application of "general principles" rather than the application of CIL. 95 The objection to using the label "customary international law" appears to be at least partly linguistic: in the absence of state practice in support of a CIL rule, it seems strange to refer to the rule as being "customary." As Robert Jennings critically observed, "most of what we perversely insist on calling customary international law is not only not customary law: it does not even faintly resemble a customary law." 96 Moreover, the ICJ Statute, these commentators point out, specifically distinguishes between the application of international custom and the application of general principles.
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It is certainly true that the standard view of CIL has difficulty capturing the way in which international adjudicators identify and apply general principles when deciding cases, even though adjudicators often purport to be doing this under the general umbrella of CIL.
It is unclear, however, how much would be gained by simply shifting the account of this phenomenon to a different label. The same concerns about judicial law-making, for example, would continue to exist. Moreover, the general principles category referred to in the ICJ Statute has traditionally been thought to be primarily a reference to gap-filling rules derived from common features of domestic legal systems (such as concerning remedies and defenses), rather than primary rules of international conduct, so it is not clear how well suited it is taking on a broader role.
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In any event, the deficiencies with the standard view of CIL do not primarily concern difficulties in articulating general principles, such as "freedom on the seas," "territorial integrity," or "equality of states." Instead, the difficulties come in attempting to reconcile potentially competing principles and in applying the principles to specific fact patterns. This is what international adjudication typically requires, but the standard view of CIL often fails to describe how judges go about it. Simply positing a separate category of general principles that do not depend on the standard view of CIL does not seem to advance the analysis concerning the application of such principles. This paper contends that a state preferences account, by contrast, does help to advance the analysis.
* * *
As noted at the outset of this paper, there are increasing doubts about the usefulness and viability of CIL as a source of international law, making this an especially appropriate time to rethink some of the assumptions concerning the operation of CIL in theory and practice. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that the claim here is not only that a state preferences approach is a better account of how CIL adjudication should work. It is also a claim that it is a better description of how it already does work in institutions like the ICJ.
These institutions may recite the standard view of CIL, but they do not actually follow it in practice. 
